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The Postconviction Review Dilemma in Ohio
In 1949 the United States Supreme Court took the position in Young v.
Ragen' that it was incumbent upon the states to provide some clear, meaning-
ful avenue for prisoners to seek review of claims that their federal constitu-
tional rights had been violated.2 In the succeeding years the states responded
by establishing procedures for postconviction review of criminal convictions,
procedures that by virtue of their broader scope largely supplant the seeking
of writs of habeas corpus in the state courts. In general, state postconviction
procedures allow petitioners to press claims that their convictions violated
rights that are constitutionally protected at the state or the federal level. Ohio
adopted such a procedure by statute 4 only after the Supreme Court repeated
its injunction to the states sixteen years later in Case v. Nebraska.5 Comity
and federalism furnished the rationale for the creation of a procedure at the
state level that was essentially parallel to the procedure for handling petitions
for writs of habeas corpus at the federal level.6 Provided that the states could
successfully create and administer their own systems of postconviction
review, the federal courts would refrain from becoming involved in state
criminal procedure.
From the time the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act was adopted com-
mentators recognized the significant problems that were to attend its adminis-
tration.7 Although some initial difficulties arose in getting trial court judges to
follow the statutory procedure, 8 the most important problems at the state
level centered on the scope and availability of postconviction review. 9 As
anticipated, those problems arose because the conviction was the product of a
prior proceeding. Thus, it would have been possible initially for postconvic-
tion procedure to assume the character of de novo review or to be controlled
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1. 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
2. Id. at 238-39.
3. For a useful discussion of state remedies, see L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 1-12
(1981). Professor Yackle classifies state remedies, whether statutory or by rule of court, on the basis of their
resemblance to common-law remedies: remedies in the nature of habeas corpus, remedies in the nature ofcoram
nobis, and remedies fitting neither description. Section 13 contains a survey of the postconviction remedies
available in the various American jurisdictions. Id. § 13.
4. Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act, 131 Ohio Laws 684 (1%5) (current version at OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2953.21-.23 (Page 1982)).
5. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
6. Id. at 344-46 (Brennan, J., concurring).
7. See generally Herman, Symposium on Post-Conviction Remedies: Foreword and Afterword, 27 OHIO
ST. L.J. 237 (1966).
8. Id. at 241; see also Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Tennessee-Fourteen Years of Judicial
Administration Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 48 TENN. L. REV. 605, 613-15 (1981).
9. Comment, Operation of the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 727, 728-29, 730-35
(1968).
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by traditional doctrines of finality. As this Comment will show, the latter is
the development that emerged under the guidance of a line of Ohio Supreme
Court decisions.' 0
On the federal level the hopes that comity and the integrity of federalism
would be preserved by the new state procedure have been mostly disappoint-
ed. While a new trend may develop in the wake of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions," until now the federal district courts in Ohio, in
heeding decisions handed down by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,' 2 have
found it necessary to review claims of constitutional violations in Ohio
criminal convictions. Under the guidance of the court of appeals a special
body of law has developed that creates exceptions to the usual standards of
availability of federal habeas corpus review for Ohio petitioners. 3 The
anomaly of an "Ohio exception" to prevailing federal-state relations on
federal review of state criminal convictions flies in the face of what Ragen and
Case and the Ohio legislative response to them had sought to achieve.
By restricting access to federal habeas corpus review on grounds of
comity and federalism, decisions of the Supreme Court early in 1982 have
undermined the viability of the "Ohio exception." Given the extremely limit-
ed availability and scope of state collateral review and the new barriers to
federal review, Ohio petitioners find themselves in a predicament: more than
ever, they are apt to find no forum willing to hear their constitutional claims,
and their claims are vulnerable to procedural default. If Ohio petitioners are to
be heard at all, current law seems to require that they make out a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Differing federal and state standards make
federal courts the best forum for such a claim. Ironically, the need for re-
course to the federal courts renders state postconviction review meaningless,
a procedural form without a function. Moreover, the centrality of the con-
stitutional issue of ineffective assistance shifts the focus of state criminal
process to that aspect of it the defendant is least able to assess or manage-
the knowledge and skill of the defense attorney. Recent developments in the
law have neglected the need for a rational basis on which to determine when
federal review of a state conviction is sufficiently compelling to override
countervailing policy considerations.
The contents and background of the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act
will be reviewed briefly. "4 Identification of the major threads in the Ohio
Supreme Court's construction of the statute will lead to an analysis of the
emergence of a special federal common law for Ohio petitioners, the "Ohio
exception," and of the frustration of comity in postconviction review of Ohio
criminal convictions. 15 An explanation of recent developments at both the
10. See generally Herman, supra note 7, at 240.
I I. See infra text accompanying notes 106-34.
12. See especially Keener v. Ridenour, 594 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979).
13. See infra subpart 11(B).
14. See infra part 1.
15. See infra part 11.
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federal and state levels will elucidate the persisting difficulties in the interpre-
tation and administration of the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act 16 and will
introduce an analysis of the present state of the law.
I. THE OHIO POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES STATUTES AND THEIR ORIGINS
A. Substance of the Statutes
Enacted in 196517 and substantially revised in 1967, 18 the Ohio postcon-
viction remedies statutes set forth both the substance and procedure of post-
conviction review. The substantive portion of the principal statute, section
2953.21 of the Ohio Revised Code, provides that any person convicted of a
criminal offense or found delinquent who claims that his' 9 rights were in-
fringed in such a way "as to render the judgment void or voidable under the
Ohio constitution or the Constitution of the United States" 20 has the right to
seek postconviction relief. The individual must file with the court that handed
down the sentence a petition requesting that the judgment or sentence be
vacated or set aside. In one of its broadest provisions, the statute states that
the petition may be filed "at any time.''21 Other appropriate relief may be
requested. The grounds for relief must be stated, and a supporting affidavit or
other documentary evidence may be filed with the petition.22 The apparent
intent of the statute is to attach such importance to a convicted defendant's
constitutional rights that a separate and distinct mechanism for collateral
review, over and above direct appeal, is warranted. The statute seems to ask
no more of the petitioner than a firm belief that his conviction was void or
voidable, a plausible theory to support that belief, and the filing of the peti-
tion. The remaining provisions establish an elaborate procedure for con-
sideration of the petition. 23 The procedure for collateral review of criminal
16. See infra subparts II(C), (D); infra part Ill.
17. 131 Ohio Laws 684 (1965) (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.21-.23 (Page 1982)).
18. Act of Sept. 8, 1967. 132 Ohio Laws 966 (1967-68). The impetus for amending came in part from
difficulties that arose in administering the broad provisions of the statutes. For example, under the original act
the petitioner had to be in custody under sentence, a requirement that created problems both for prisoners
incarcerated under one sentence who were challenging a separate proceeding that resulted in a second sentence
and for individuals on probation or parole. Comment, Operation of the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 727, 728-29 (1968).
19. The author recognizes that the provisions of the statutes apply equally to women and men. The use of
the grammatical masculine is not intended to denote the gender of any natural person.
20. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(A) (Page 1982) (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 2953.21(B)-(H); § 2953.22; § 2953.23. Once docketed, the petition is to be promptly brought to the
court's attention. The court must make a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether substantive
grounds for relief exist. That review must take into account not only the petition and supporting documentation,
but also all materials, including the trial record, relevant to the proceedings against the petitioner. If the court
dismisses, it must make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. § 2953.21(C). The prosecuting
attorney may respond by demurrer, answer, or motion within ten days of docketing. Within twenty days
thereafter, either party may move for summary judgment, although the right to summary judgment must appear
on the face of the record. Id. § 2953.21(D). Without leave, the petitioner may amend his petition at any time prior
to the filing of the demurrer, answer, or motion, and thereafter at any time with the court's permission. Id.
§ 2953.21(F). Unless the petition was denied as a result of the court's preliminary review, the court is to hold a
prompt hearing and to make and file written findings of fact and conclusions of law at the point that judgment is
entered. Id. § 2953.21(E). If the court finds that grounds for granting relief exist, it is to vacate and set aside the
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:537
convictions in Ohio has not only spawned much litigation, but has also raised
serious questions in the federal courts about the kind of substantive protec-
tions that Ohio collateral review actually affords. 24
B. Legislative Background
I. Response to the Crisis in the State Courts
Prior to enactment of the postconviction remedies statutes, although
other avenues of relief were theoretically available, collateral attack via
habeas corpus proceedings was the usual route for review of alleged constitu-
tional defects. 25 Responding to an ever increasing number of habeas corpus
petitions, the Ohio Supreme Court severely limited the scope and availability
of the remedy. In a 1963 decision, Perry v. Maxwell,26 the court held that
relief would be granted only when the trial court lacked traditional personal or
subject matter jurisdiction. This holding contravened the standing federal rule
that for purposes of postconviction review of federal convictions constitu-
tional defects were jurisdictional defects.2 7 Two years later the court declared
in dictum that the status of habeas corpus in Ohio was solely that of a pre-
conviction remedy for illegal detention.28 Paradoxically, the court did make
occasional, though inconsistent, exceptions to its own rule, notably when a
petitioner proceeded at least in part on the issue of right to counsel.2
9
Despite the restrictive approach of the Ohio Supreme Court, the volume
earlier judgment and, when appropriate, discharge or resentence an incarcerated individual, grant him a new
trial, or stay execution of the death penalty. In addition, supplemental orders concerning reassignment, retrial,
custody, and bail are permitted. Id. § 2953.21(G)-(H). Generally, the emphasis is on flexibility in fashioning
remedies.
Two additional procedural matters are specified in separate sections of the Ohio Revised Code. First, if a
hearing is granted, the petitioner may be present, and if he is incarcerated, the court has the authority to issue a
warrant to make his presence possible. Testimony of the petitioner on his own behalf, and testimony of other
witnesses, may be offered by deposition. Id. § 2953.22. Thus, the statute is designed to respect broad principles
of due process. Second, whether or not the petition justifies a hearing, the trial court has the discretion to
entertain successive petitions for relief. The award or denial of relief is an appealable final judgment. Id.
§ 2953.23. While the statute provides bars to repeated petitioning, it does allow the petitioner considerable
latitude in making his request as well as recourse to appellate review of a denial.
As originally enacted, the statutes included § 2953.24, which provided for appointment of counsel. That
section was repealed, effective in 1976, upon establishment of state and county public defender programs. Ohio
Public Defender Act, 136 Ohio Laws 1868, 1895 (1975-76).
24. See infra subpart II(B).
25. See Herman, supra note 7, at 237-38.
26. 175 Ohio St. 369, 195 N.E.2d 103 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 958 (1964). See Recent Development,
The Availability of Habeas Corpus to Attack a Criminal Indictment After Conviction, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 496
(1965).
27. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
28. Walker v. Maxwell, I Ohio St. 2d 136, 137, 205 N.E.2d 394, 395 (1965) (per curiam).
29. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Maxwell, I Ohio St. 2d 91, 204 N.E.2d 533 (1965); Madison v. Maxwell, 177
Ohio St. 84, 202 N.E.2d 617 (1964). By contrast, in Carter v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 35, 201 N.E.2d 623 (1964)
(per curiam), the court ruled on petitioner's contentions that his detention was illegal because he was convicted
under a void indictment, that his sentence was void for vagueness, and that he had been improperly returned to
prison for parole violation; however, his contention of incompetent counsel was ruled noncognizable in habeas
corpus. Likewise, in Braxton v. Maxwell, I Ohio St. 2d 134, 205 N.E.2d 397 (1965) (per curiam), a pro se
petitioner's allegations of defective indictment, denial of due process because of failure to try separately on
separate counts, defective sentencing, and lack of counsel at the time of arrest were reviewed and found
insufficient to justify postconviction relief. See Recent Development, The Availability of Habeas Corpus to
Attack a Criminal Indictment After Conviction, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 496, 505-06 (1965).
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of habeas corpus petitions continued to grow, 0 and the legislature enacted the
Post-Conviction Remedy Act as an emergency measure because postconvic-
tion collateral review was deemed "the best method of protecting constitu-
tional rights of individuals and, at the same time, providing a more orderly
method of hearing such matters."'" The preclusive effect of the new remedy
on most petitions for habeas corpus was confirmed when the Ohio Supreme
Court held shortly after the new statutes went into effect that the availability
of statutory postconviction remedies was grounds for denial of relief in both
pending and future habeas corpus actions. 2
2. Federal-State Judicial Relations
The background of federal-state judicial relations at the time the Act was
adopted throws into relief some of the ongoing problems with Ohio postcon-
viction remedies. Case v. Nebraska,3 a landmark United States Supreme
Court decision, dates from the same year as the enactment of the Ohio Post-
Conviction Remedy Act. In Case the Court vacated and remanded a decision
of the Nebraska Supreme Court that had affirmed the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition alleging unconstitutional denial of assistance of counsel.
3 4
Although the Nebraska court had conceded that the petitioner's allegations, if
true, would establish a violation of the federal constitution, 5 it nevertheless
adopted a position identical to that taken three months earlier by the Ohio
Supreme Court.3 6 The Nebraska court stated: "Habeas corpus is not avail-
able to discharge a prisoner from a sentence of penal servitude if the court
imposing it had jurisdiction of the offense and of the person charged with the
crime, and the sentence was within the power of the court." 3 7 Although the
United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari to consider the states'
obligations under the fourteenth amendment to provide a meaningful remedial
process for reviewing and deciding claims of violation of federal constitutional
guarantees, the question was mooted by the Nebraska legislature's adoption
of a postconviction procedure statute effective three days prior to oral argu-
ment. 8 Justice Clark's concurrence noted that as early as 1949 in Young v.
Ragen3 9 the Court had articulated the principle that the states were obligated
to afford some clear means for prisoners to raise claims of denial of federal
rights, but that Nebraska was only the thirteenth state to adopt such a proce-
dure.40
30. Herman, supra note 7, at 239.
31. 131 Ohio Laws 1611 (1965). This section of the act was not codified.
32. Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4,6,210 N.E.2d 885, 886-87 (1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1017 (1966). See Herman, supra note 7, at 239.
33. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
34. Id. at 337. The Nebraska decision, Case v. State, appears at 177 Neb. 404, 129 N.W.2d 107 (1964).
35. 177 Neb. 404, 410, 129 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1964).
36. Walker v. Maxwell, I Ohio St. 2d 136, 205 N.E.2d 394 (1965) (per curiam).
37. 177 Neb. 404, 412, 129 N.W.2d 107, 112 (1964).
38. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336,336-37 (1965). The text of the Nebraska statutes, which have not been
amended since adoption, is found in NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001 to -3004 (1979).
39. 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
40. 381 U.S. 336, 337-38 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring).
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Many of the initial difficulties in administering the Ohio statutes may
have arisen because the law was almost a verbatim copy of the Nebraska
statute, which was still very recent and hence devoid of decisional gloss. 4'
But the Ohio statutes did not reflect the judicial experience of other jurisdic-
tions in accommodating the goal of a procedure designed to preserve all
meritorious cases with the conflicting goal of a procedure capable of separat-
ing out frivolous petitions. As a result the interpretation of the statutes by the
Ohio courts has produced a restrictive approach to postconviction review in
the state courts and a counterbalancing expansive approach in the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
A. The State Courts
Early decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court centered on the statutory
procedure for postconviction review and confirmed the need to adhere strictly
to it. 42 The court considered more substantive issues for the first time in 1967
in State v. Perry.43 Faced with four petitions for postconviction relief alleging
constitutional defects in procedure at both the trial and appellate levels, the
court held that the Ohio statutes did not contemplate a second opportunity to
litigate claims in postconviction proceedings if no allegations were made that
the claims could not have been fully adjudicated during the trial and subse-
quent appeal."
Although Perry raised some procedural questions similar to those in the
earlier decisions, the scope of collateral review under the statutes was at the
heart of the decision. The Perry court attempted to define the terms "void or
voidable," used in the statute to designate the basis for collateral attack. The
court dealt only summarily with the term "void," proclaiming that it goes to
the jurisdictional foundation of the judgment of conviction:
Within the meaning of the statute, ajudgment of conviction is void if rendered by a
court having either no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or no jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime for
which he was convicted. Conversely, where a judgment of conviction is rendered
41. See generally Symposium on Post-Conviction Remedies, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 237-336, (1966).
42. Jones v. State, 8 Ohio St. 2d 21, 222 N.E.2d 313 (1966) (when the record does not contain sufficient
facts, a court denying a petition must conduct a hearing to file the findings of fact and conclusions of law
required by law); State ex rel. Turpin v. Court of Common Pleas, 8 Ohio St. 2d 1,220 N.E.2d 670 (1966) (writ of
mandamus can issue to compel a court of common pleas to rule on a petition pending for twelve months); accord
State v. Lester, 41 Ohio St. 2d 51, 322 N.E.2d 656 (1975).
43. 10 Ohio St. 2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). Contra Laugesen v. State, It Ohio Misc. 10, 227 N.E.2d
663 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1967) (decided one day before Perry). "Common sense would seem to dictate that
postconviction remedies exist to try fundamental issues of constitutional guarantees that have not been tried
before. Ordinary principles of finality of judgments must apply to all questions which have been completely
litigated." Id. at 13, 227 N.E.2d at 666.
44. 10 Ohio St. 2d 175, 182, 226 N.E.2d 104, 109 (1967).
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by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and jurisdiction of
the subject matter, such judgment is not void, and the cause of action merged
therein becomes res judicata as between the state and the defendant.45
Thus, any question of voidness would be wholly preliminary, because logical-
ly prior, to all aspects of criminal trial procedure.
The term "voidable," however, proved less transparent. The court
reasoned that the operative distinction lay in the possibility that a judgment
that was not jurisdictionally defective could be set aside by appellate review.
On the basis of that distinction the court envisioned the possibility of ruling
that constitutional issues could be litigated in postconviction proceedings,
even though the issues had been or could have been fully litigated by the
petitioner at the original trial or on direct appeal, "and thus have been adjudi-
cated against him." 46 The court concluded, however, that such an outcome
would be incompatible with the doctrine of res judicata.47 The court went on
to construe "voidable" to fit only those situations in which a petitioner could
not have raised an issue at trial or on direct appeal: specifically, discovery of
new facts, and lack of representation by counsel at the trial or in making a plea
of guilty that resulted in conviction. 4 Having thus managed to stop short of
declaring the term "voidable" devoid of any functional meaning, the court
was able to enunciate a rule that was to be repeated unrelentingly in the Ohio
courts: under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars
the defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except on direct
appeal, any defense or alleged lack of due process that was raised or could
have been raised at the trial resulting in conviction or on appeal from that
judgment.49
The importance of Perry went well beyond its enunciation of the major
rule of Ohio postconviction procedure. First, in a ctirious line of reasoning,
the court justified its interpretation of "voidable" in Perry by recourse to the
history of the common law rather than to the legislative intent. The court
speculated that the common-law writs of coram nobis and coram vobis50
might have permitted assertion of claims that it deemed cognizable under the
"voidable" judgment theory of postconviction review. 5' The writ of coram
nobis was used to review, correct, or vacate a judgment when no other
remedy was available. The scope of review was limited to errors of fact that
were extrinsic to the record, affected the validity of the proceedings, were not
45. Id. at 178-79, 226 N.E.2d at 107.
46. Id. at 179, 226 N.E.2d at 107.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 179-80, 226 N.E.2d at 107-08.
49. Id.
50. The distinction between the two writs never had any practical importance and represented no more
than a formal distinction based on the court in which the proceedings were held. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Coram
Nobis and Allied Statutory Remedies § 1 (1965).
51. 10 Ohio St. 2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104, 108 (1967).
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put in issue at trial, were unknown at the time of the trial through no fault of
the petitioner, or were unknown to the trial court but would have prevented
rendition of judgment if known. 5 Because of the evidentiary orientation of
review under the writs, it is difficult to see how they provide any conceptual
basis for postconviction review of claims based on lack of counsel. Moreover,
the court ruled that because an earlier Ohio Supreme Court decision 53 had
held that the two writs were not part of Ohio criminal jurisprudence,54 only
habeas corpus relief had been available prior to the 1965 enactment.5 5 The
court's discussion reduces to a justification of its broad application of res
judicata in arriving at the Perry rule. While the court cited authority to the
effect that relief under a writ of coram nobis is barred when the petitioner, at
the time of trial, knew of the factual error, or would have but for his lack of
diligence,56 that tack only confuses waiver with res judicata and obscures the
real questions of statutory interpretation.57
As was recognized early in the history of the Post-Conviction Remedy
Act, when the Perry court chose finality of judgment over the countervailing
policy of full and fair adjudication, postconviction review in Ohio was severe-
ly restricted,58 in total disregard of the legislative intent behind it. This result
was facilitated by the court's assimilation of the ambivalent concept of waiver
into the doctrine of res judicata.
In its Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies59 the American
Bar Association distinguishes between waiver as a rule of finality of judg-
ment, that is, issues not presented at a specified time or in a specified way are
said to have been waived, and the principle that a party to a criminal action
can, with binding effect, make a knowing and informed choice to forego
certain rights. The former is procedural, while the latter is a corollary of the
law creating the right. The significance of the distinction comes into sharp
focus when a federal constitutional right is considered in a state postconvic-
tion proceeding: what constitutes a waiver in the sense of a voluntary relin-
quishment is a question of federal constitutional law, while the scope of a
prior judgment is a question of state procedural law. 6°
If the state court denies relief on the grounds that the applicant intelligently and
understandingly waived the right in question, it has rendered a decision on a
question of federal constitutional law. On the other hand, if the state court denies
52. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Coram Nobis and Allied Statutory Remedies § 3 (1965).
53. State v. Hayslip, 90 Ohio St. 199, 107 N.E. 335 (1914).
54. Id.
55. 10 Ohio St. 2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104, 108 (1967).
56. Id. at 180-81, 226 N.E.2d at 108 (citing 18 AM. JUR. 2D Coram Nobis and Allied Statutory Remedies
§ 33 (1965)).
57. See Comment, Operation of the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 727, 732-35
(1968).
58. Id. at 733.
59. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICrION REMEDIES (Ap-
proved Draft 1968).
60. Id. § 6.1 commentary at 88-89.
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relief on the ground that the applicant should have raised the question at some
earlier proceeding, it has rendered a decision on a question purely of state law.
Where it is found that an applicant has relinquished a right, the decision is tanta-
mount to holding that the right was never violated. The decision, thus, is directly
on the merits. Where the foreclosure by judgment rule is applied, the court refuses
to reach the merits of the asserted denial of the constitutional right.
61
In sum, the distinction entails important implications concerning federalism
and adjudication on the merits.
Strictly speaking, res judicata denotes two concepts regarding a valid
final judgment: the preclusion of claims (merger and bar), preventing relitiga-
tion between the parties of all matters that figured in the same cause of action
regardless of whether they were actually litigated; and the preclusion of issues
(collateral estoppel), giving binding effect in a subsequent action to issues
litigated and decided in a previous case involving the party to be estopped,
provided that that party had the opportunity and the incentive to litigate the
issue.6' Intentional waiver turns on the facts of each individual situation,
while res judicata represents a sweeping judicial doctrine designed to promote
finality of judgment, to which exceptions are recognized when an overriding
social policy is present and when manifest injustice would result from strict
application.63 While res judicata imposes both finality on litigated claims and
forfeiture of rights on unlitigated claims, the legislative history of the Ohio
postconviction collateral review statutes indicates that the stakes in criminal
prosecutions are sufficient to warrant a second opportunity to litigate a previ-
ously unlitigated substantive claim.64
The Supreme Court has said that the unique purpose of collateral review
through habeas corpus proceedings has been to create an exception to the
doctrine of res judicata.65 Any other application of the principles of finality of
judgment creates an almost insuperable presumption that the criminal defen-
dant fully understood what transpired at the trial and made a rational choice
not to raise constitutional defenses, if any existed. Under Ohio procedure it
should be possible for a trial court reviewing a postconviction petition to
determine accurately what the defendant understood and chose to do or not to
do; thus from the standpoint of procedure alone the Perry rule may be un-
necessary. Stated more abstractly, the expansive interpretation of res judicata
in Perry obliterates the distinct concept of intentional waiver by failing to
acknowledge that res judicata, a common-law doctrine of judicial administra-
tion, is necessarily subordinate within the legal system to concepts, such as
61. Id. at 89.
62. See generally IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405-.448 (2d ed. 1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 13, 17-20, 26-28 (1982).
63. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[11] (2d ed. 1982).
64. See supra text accompanying note 31.
65. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n.12 (1980); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973). The
statutory basis for the exception appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
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waiver, that indicate an individual's status under constitutional and statutory
law. The thrust of the Perry rule is the refusal of the Ohio Supreme
Court to have the Ohio courts shoulder the burden of Young v. Ragen, but the
reasoning used to justify that intransigence is conceptually confused.
A second major aspect of Perry's importance derived from the immediate
federal response to the decision, the beginning of ongoing tension between the
federal and Ohio courts over the availability of state postconviction relief. In
Coley v. Alvis 66 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the denial of a
petition for habeas corpus. Although relief had been denied because Coley
had failed to exhaust state remedies, 67 the narrow construction given the Ohio
postconviction statutes in Perry, handed down while Coley's appeal of the
denial of his petition was pending, led the Sixth Circuit to find that there was
"no longer any effective remedy open to the Appellant to exhaust" and that
Perry had "rendered such process ineffective to protect the rights of Appel-
lant.'' s Subsequent to Coley the Ohio Supreme Court modified its Perry
stance by permitting collateral review of an allegedly involuntary plea of
guilty under the postconviction remedies statutes.69
B. Federal Decisions and the Emergence of the Futility Exception
Although the federal courts in Ohio had initially perceived the new state
postconviction review as distinct from, and much broader in scope than, the
former state habeas corpus review,70 that perception gave way to the Coley
court's more realistic recognition that federal habeas corpus review had to
remain a mainstay of judicial review if the constitutional rights of individuals
convicted under Ohio criminal law were to be protected.7' Indeed, a line of
federal decisions attempted to articulate the exact relationship between state
postconviction review and federal review and to identify any operative excep-
tions to the Perry rule. 72 Among the most important of these is Terrell v.
Perini.73 In Terrell the district court had dismissed a petition on the ground of
66. 381 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1967).
67. Id. at 871. The federal habeas corpus statute predicates the granting of the writ on a showing that the
petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of
available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
68. 381 F.2d 870, 872 (6th Cir. 1967).
69. State v. Milanovich, 42 Ohio St. 2d 46, 325 N.E.2d 540 (1975). The limited holding of this decision was
no more than a variant of the existing ineffective assistance of counsel exception to the application of res
judicata in postconviction proceedings. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
70. Olney v. Green, 247 F. Supp. 368 (N.D. Ohio 1965). The ensuing discussion identifies trends in the
Sixth Circuit's handling of petitions from Ohio petitioners. Much of the Sixth Circuit's approach is inconsistent
with the thrust of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), which will be discussed later. See infra note I01;see
also infra text accompanying notes 96-105.
71. See supra text accompanying note 68.
72. See especially Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); Mackey v.
Koloski, 413 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1969); Keener v. Ridenour, 594 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979); Riley v. Havener, 391
F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
73. 414 F.2d 1231 (6th Cir. 1969).
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failure to exhaust state remedies. The constitutional violations allegedly vitia-
ting the petitioner's conviction included coerced confession, defective indict-
ment, and incompetent counsel. 74 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that because the trial court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction
and because the questions raised, other than competence of counsel, could
have been adjudicated at trial, the judgment of conviction was neither void
nor voidable under the rule of Perry. However, since the petitioner could not
have known of the alleged incompetence of his counsel until after the trial and
since the issues of coerced confession and defective indictment were not
cognizable under the Perry analysis, the petitioner was entitled to proceed in
federal court because he had exhausted state remedies on those claims. 75 The
Ohio Supreme Court subsequently responded by recognizing an exception to
the Perry rule on the isolated issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.76
A second exception to the exhaustion requirement emerged in Mackey v.
Koloski.77 The issue was whether a petitioner, appealing denial of his federal
habeas petition, should be required to seek a delayed appeal of the denial of
his motion to vacate his sentence in order to exhaust state remedies prior to
seeking federal relief. Again, the restrictive Perry rule was held to warrant
opening the doors of the federal courts to Ohio petitioners.78
The following year, in a well-reasoned decision, Allen v. Perini,79 the
Sixth Circuit took up yet another variation on what constituted exhaustion of
state remedies for Ohio petitioners in federal court. Allen failed, on the
authority of the Perry decision, to appeal the dismissal of his petition for
postconviction relief. He had been convicted on a plea of guilty and had
resorted to postconviction remedies to press his claim that the plea was
coerced and, therefore, violated his constitutional rights. 80 To the State's
argument that the postconviction relief available to the petitioner was broader
74. Id. at 1232-33.
75. Id. at 1233. Under the federal habeas corpus statute, the granting of the writ is predicated on a showing
that the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an
absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffec-
tive to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) (emphasis supplied). After Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509 (1982), a federal habeas court is required to dismiss a petition containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims. See infra text accompanying notes 107-14.
76. State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St. 2d 71,341 N.E.2d 304 (1976) (when the record does not disclose that the
issue of counsel's competence had been adjudicated, res judicata does not apply); State v. Juliano, 24 Ohio St.
2d 117, 265 N.E.2d 290 (1970) (per curiam); City of Dayton v. Hill, 21 Ohio St. 2d 125, 256 N.E.2d 194 (1970) (the
court stated without explanation that alleged denial of adequate counsel eliminated the question of resjudicata
decided in Perry); accord Burrows v. Engle, 545 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1976); Esherick v. Perini, 475 F.2d 577 (6th
Cir. 1973); see Steed v. Salisbury, 459 F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1972) (because ineffective assistance of counsel is
cognizable under the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act, habeas corpus will not lie in federal court until the
state remedy is exhausted).
77. 413 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1969).
78. Id. at 1021.
79. 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970), denial of petition on remand aff'd, 458 F.2d
233 (6th Cir. 1972).
80. Id. at 139-40.
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than indicated in Perry, the Allen court responded with a combination of
general policy reflections and judicial prodding:
This Court would prefer strongly to agree with ... the State on this point. It
would be highly desirable for Ohio prisoners to have all the relief available in the
state courts of Ohio that is available by federal habeas corpus. The judges of this
Court as well as the United States District Judges of Ohio would prefer that these
issues be determined by State courts ....81
Thus, a clear conflict between the state and federal courts in Ohio over
responsibility for constitutional safeguards in the criminal process had
emerged.
Part of the importance of the decision lay in the court's affirmance of the
Coley principle: in the words of the Allen court, an appeal from dismissal of a
petition for postconviction relief on the ground of coerced inculpatory state-
ments would have been "futile under the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
in State v. Perry., 82 From this premise the court concluded that in the ab-
sence of any Ohio decision modifying the Perry rule, the exhaustion require-
ment did not oblige a petitioner proceeding on grounds such as Allen's to
appeal from the state court dismissal prior to seeking relief in federal court. 83
The Allen decision brought together the individual exceptions to the exhaus-
tion requirement, which had been identified in earlier decisions under the
general designation "futility exception,' ' 84 and thereby acquired abiding
significance. The pointed language of the Allen court suggests two conclu-
sions. First, the federal courts were doubtless aware of the Ohio Supreme
Court's strategy of displacing postconviction litigation from the state courts
and were impatient with the State's continued claim of nonexhaustion in
response to federal petitions when exhaustion entailed only futile state court
proceedings. Second, a logical extension of the futility doctrine as pro-
pounded by the Allen court would have exempted petitioners from making
any effort to seek relief in the state courts, even at the trial court level.
More recently, the Sixth Circuit recapitulated and synthesized the per-
tinent federal decisional law in what has become the leading case on the
"Ohio exception," Keener v. Ridenour.85 The importance of this decision lay,
first, in its clear articulation of the relationship between state and federal
collateral proceedings, and second, in its identification of the test for bypass-
81. Id. at 139 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)); see also Keener v. Ridenour, 594 F.2d 581,
591 (6th Cir. 1979).
82. 424 F.2d 134, 139 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 139-40.
84. Id. at 139. The futility exception has played an important role in lower federal court decisions. See,
e.g., Collins v. Perini, 448 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Brenson v. Havener, 403 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Ohio
1975); see also Matthews v. Wingo, 474 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985 (1973) (Kentucky
petitioner not required to file in state court a second motion to vacate judgment on new grounds). It is important
to remember that despite the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement that have been established for Ohio
prisoners, the requirement remains in force in many situations; see, e.g., King v. Perini, 431 F. Supp. 481 (N.D.
Ohio 1976).
85. 594 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), dismissal on remand aff'd, 640 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1981).
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ing the exhaustion requirement. The court's discussion of the exhaustion
requirement began with its citation of the American Bar Association's decla-
ration that the purpose of postconviction collateral action is to allow "review
of fundamental issues not considered in prior proceedings." 86 Contrasting
with the restrictive holding in Perry the Supreme Court's holding in Fay v.
Noia8 7 that the federal courts have the power to grant habeas relief to peti-
tioners whose federal claims would not be directly reviewable by the Supreme
Court because of adequate and independent state grounds for the decision,
88
the court concluded that Ohio postconviction collateral relief is not coexten-
sive with federal habeas corpus relief. Hence, short of amendment of the Ohio
statute, constitutional claims that have not been reviewed by the courts of
Ohio remain cognizable in federal court.89 An implicit test for determining
whether a petitioner's recourse to the federal courts overcame the hurdle of
the exhaustion rule emerged in the ensuing discussion. When collateral relief
is unavailable or ineffective as a state remedy, exhaustion is not required
before resort to the federal courts.90 Recent decisions of the federal district
courts in Ohio indicate that the Keener standard continues as the operative
rule for Ohio prisoners' petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 9'
The Keener court's broad language had the effect of opening wide the
doors of the federal courts to Ohio petitioners, at least until recent United
States Supreme Court decisions revamped the common law in the field. Given
the court's position on the purposes of postconviction collateral action, 92 in
the Sixth Circuit federal habeas review afforded an opportunity for review of
issues that are fundamental in nature, regardless of whether they have been
raised at any stage prior to the filing of the federal habeas petition. However,
the difficult problem of distinguishing fundamental issues from those that are
not remains.
The Keener court dealt with the specific issues raised by the petitioner by
articulating a test for what is cognizable under the Ohio statute. Because
petitioner's constitutional claim, based on double jeopardy, could have been
fully litigated at trial or on direct appeal, it was held not cognizable under the
Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act as construed by Perry. Therefore, peti-
86. Id. at 589 (relying on AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVIC-
TION REMEDIES § 6.1 commentary at 86 (Approved Draft 1968)).
87. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
88. Id. at 434. The broadening of the availability of federal habeas corpus in Noia has been supplanted by
the resurrection of the adequate state ground doctrine in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See generally
Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Spritzer,
Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1978); Tire Resurrected
Adequate State Ground in Federal Habeas Corpus, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 723 (1979).
89. 594 F.2d 581, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 590.
91. See, e.g. Gambill v. Marshall, 532 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (petitioner went directly to federal
court on habeas corpus petition after having pressed direct appeal in state court); Mostade v. Engle, 507 F.
Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (petitioner had exhausted all available and effective state remedies); see infra text
accompanying notes 135-43.
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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tioner had exhausted available state remedies on that claim and was properly
in federal court. 93 Petitioner's second claim, however, alleged that, because
of a defect in bind-over procedure, the trial court had never obtained jurisdic-
tion over him. On the basis of its allegation that the judgment of conviction
was void, the second claim, which did not turn on a federal constitutional
question, was found cognizable under state law, not federal law. Thus, having
failed to exhaust all avenues of appeal to the state courts, petitioner was not
properly in federal court on the second claim. 94 The cognizable issue test
effectuates a policy of making available effective review of any genuine con-
stitutional issue. Provided that they are based on the federal constitution,
claims that are doomed to failure under Ohio decisional law present valid
federal questions, and those that Ohio courts will review do not. Such a
system has much to recommend it from the standpoint of procedural efficien-
cy, but it perpetuates federal responsibility for assuring protection of constitu-
tional rights within state criminal procedure. 95
C. Closing the Doors of the Federal Courts After Wainwright v. Sykes
The Keener court's willingness to keep the doors of the federal courts
open contrasts sharply with the general trend toward restricting the avail-
ability of federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Wainwright v. Sykes. 96 Sykes, criti-
cized for being deficient in clear reasoning, 97 apparently resuscitated the
adequate state ground doctrine in federal habeas corpus review. Broadly,
according to that jurisdictional doctrine the Supreme Court will not directly
review a state court decision that rests on an independent and adequate state
ground. 98 Thus, while the Supreme Court will review the federal questions in
a state case that do not rest on such a state ground, it generally will not review
a state court's interpretation of its own law. 99 It follows that a state conviction
will not stand up when federal rights have been violated, but federal court
review of the federal issues is blocked when the defendant has failed to
comply with the requirements of state procedure. In Sykes the majority held
that noncompliance with state procedure barred relief, unless the petitioner
could show both cause for, and resultant prejudice from, such a waiver."0
93. 594 F.2d 581, 590 (6th Cir. 1979). However, under the cause and prejudice test of Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), consideration of this claim seems to have been precluded. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 96-105; see also Comment, Habeas Corpus: The Sixth Circuit Interprets the Cause and Prejudice Test
of Wainwright v. Sykes, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 862 (1979).
94. 594 F.2d 581, 591 (6th Cir. 1979).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
96. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
97. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent
Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1978); Soloff, Litigation and Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297 (1978).
98. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 107 (3d ed. 1976).
99. Id.
100. 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977).
[Vol. 44:537
OHIO POSTCONVICTION REVIEW DILEMMA
The Sykes opinion does not explain the relationship between the cause
and prejudice test and the adequate state ground doctrine in a way that gives
clear guidance to the lower federal courts. Comment on Sykes, pointing to this
imprecision, has suggested that the cause and prejudice standard may have
paradoxically resulted in broadening the availablity of habeas corpus review
rather than in narrowing it as the majority intended. This broadening effect
derived from the ambiguity of the cause and prejudice standard, which tended
to expand the discretion of the federal courts in granting relief after a proce-
dural default.' 0 ' And indeed, after Sykes the federal courts in Ohio have set
the threshold of compliance with state procedure relatively low for Ohio
habeas corpus petitioners. 0 2
More revealing in the present context is the Keener court's handling of
the potential obstacle of the Sykes holding. "The rules permitting federal
habeas relief are not absolute. If the State can show that a prisoner 'deliber-
ately bypassed' State remedies or is precluded from raising his claim through,
[sic] 'inexcusable procedural default' of a State rule or provision, federal
habeas corpus relief is precluded." 03 Thus, the Sixth Circuit has handled the
Sykes cause and prejudice test in a manner that creates a strong presumption
in favor of the petitioner. Only when he has blatantly disregarded the avail-
ability of state relief is a petitioner to be denied access to the federal courts. In
effect, the Keener court disregarded any modification that Sykes may have
made in the availablity of federal habeas corpus review and assimilated the
cause and prejudice standard into the established deliberate bypass standard
of Fay v. Noia,104 thereby preserving Noia's broad construction of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction. But the court did not consider the reason for
Keener's failure to raise the postconviction issue on direct appeal. It is there-
fore reasonable to conclude that the issues raised in the habeas corpus peti-
tion were of the kind the court regarded as "fundamental"; that is, issues
warranting the kind of constitutional protection that the Sixth Circuit has
fostered for Ohio petitioners.'0 5
101. The Resurrected Adequate State Ground in Federal Habeas Corpus, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 723, 732
n.55, 733-34 (1979). One commentator has suggested that the Sixth Circuit has applied the cause and prejudice
test with an eye to equitable results rather than to the test's defintional problems. Comment, Habeas Corpus:
The Sixth Circuit Interprets the Cause and Prejudice Test of Wainwright v. Sykes, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 862,
874-75 (1979).
102. See, e.g., Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971); Allen
v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); Heard v. Jago, 515 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Ohio
1980); Collins v. Perini, 448 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1979); Sander v. Ohio,
365 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd rem., 500 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
103. 594 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
104. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 102 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), the viability of this position is
highly questionable. See infra text accompanying notes 115-34.
105. 594 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 1979).
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D. The October 1981 Term of the United States Supreme Court
Until recently, a clear inconsistency existed between the state and the
federal courts' handling of petitions for collateral relief under the Ohio Post-
Conviction Remedy Act. Generally, as long as petitioners fell within the
futility exception or raised fundamental issues, their petitions were assured of
review on the merits in the federal courts. The October 1981 term of the
United States Supreme Court, however, produced decisions that cast serious
doubt on the future availablity of federal postconviction review for Ohio
prisoners. 06 In Rose v. Lundy' °7 a deeply divided court, considering the
impact of the exhaustion requirement on "mixed petitions" for habeas corpus
brought in federal court, held that such petitions must be dismissed, leaving
the petitioner with the option of returning to state court and meeting the
exhaustion requirement or amending the habeas petition to save only the
exhausted claims.' 08 Although recognizing the question of exhaustion of state
remedies, the district court had granted the petition on the ground that the
defendant had not received a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the petitioner's
constitutional rights had been seriously impaired.'19 Justified broadly by
comity and the absence of any unreasonable impairment of the petitioner's
rights, the Court's decision did not explore what might constitute exhaustion.
In dictum responding to the argument that the Court's holding would foster
complication and delay in the disposition of habeas petitions, "o however, the
majority made it clear that exhaustion results only from court proceedings:
"[O]ur interpretation of [the federal habeas corpus statute] provides a simple
and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims to
federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court." "'t
In a particularly cogent dissent Justice Stevens, arguing for restricting the
availablity of federal habeas corpus review, adopted a line of reasoning that is
compatible with the fundamental issues doctrine identified in Sixth Circuit
opinions. After asserting that claims of constitutional error are not fungible,
Justice Stevens proposed a four-part classification of such claims: (1) claims
that attach a constitutional label to facts that disclose no violation of a consti-
tutional right; (2) those that are not sufficiently important in the context of the
particular case to justify reversal even on direct appeal; (3) those that, while
106. Three major cases dealing with the availability of federal habeas corpus review were decided within a
few weeks of each other: Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); United States
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). The Frady decision, which centers on the "plain error" standard, is not directly
relevant to the present discussion.
107. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
108. Id. at 510. At 513 n.5 the Court noted that only the Fifth and Ninth Circuits had adopted the "'total
exhaustion" rule, while the majority of the courts of appeals, including the Sixth Circuit, had not. The Court
cited as the leading Sixth Circuit case Meeks v. Jago, 548 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844
(1977).
109. 455 U.S. 509, 513 (1982).
110. Id. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).
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justifying reversal on direct appeal, do not reveal the kind of fundamental
unfairness that will support a collateral attack on a final judgment; and (4)
those that are so fundamental that they infect the validity of the original
judgment or the integrity of the process that led to it. " 2 Though subject to
changing societal values, only the fundamental fairness at issue in the fourth
type of claim would justify collateral relief."' Referring specifically to the
cause and prejudice standard and to the Lundy total exhaustion rule, Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion went on to condemn needless judicial lawmaking
and in particular the symbiotic relationship between the flood of habeas litiga-
tion and the Court's willingness to indulge in creating special procedural
rules. Justice Stevens concluded that "[t]he availablity of habeas corpus relief
should depend primarily on the character of the alleged constitutional viola-
tion and not on the procedural history underlying the claim." " 4 This conclu-
sion provides a rational basis for selective review in the federal courts of state
convictions. In effect, Justice Stevens has proposed a workable position be-
tween the Noia rule's marked broadening of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion and the retrenchment of the federal courts' discretion effected by the
recent Supreme Court decisions. This same willingness to place substance
before procedure has formed the basis of many of the Sixth Circuit's disposi-
tions of Ohio prisoners' petitions.
A month later the Supreme Court handed down another decision, Engle
v. Isaac,"15 that further limited the scope of federal habeas corpus review.
This time the case consolidated the separate cases of three Ohio petitioners
whose denial of relief in the district court had been reversed by the Sixth
Circuit.' '6 The Court's opinion, in upholding the validity of the Sykes cause
and prejudice standard, has far-reaching implications, potentially greater than
those of Lundy. While much of the Isaac opinion concerns the allocation of
burden of proof under Ohio law when the defendant raises self-defense, some
aspects of Isaac's petition itself have special relevance to the present discus-
sion. The precise order of events is crucial. In a trial that resulted in his
conviction for aggravated assault, Isaac had raised the defense of self-defense
and had not objected when the jury was instructed that he carried the burden
of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence." 7 On direct
appeal to the court of appeals, Isaac relied on the intervening decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Robinson 118 to challenge the burden-of-proof
instructions. '9 In Robinson the court had held that under recently changed
112. Id. at 543-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. The examples Justice Stevens cites make clear that fundamental unfairness results from only the
most egregious miscarriages of justice.
114. Id. at 547-48.
115. 456 U.S. 107, reh'g denied, 102 S. Ct. 2286, 102 S. Ct. 2976 (1982).
116. Id. at 116-19 (1982) (citing Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980); Hughes v. Engle, 642 F.2d 451
(6th Cir. 1980); Bell v. Perini, 635 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1980)).
117. 456 U.S. 107, 114-15 (1982).
118. 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976).
119. 456 U.S. 107, 115 (1982).
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Ohio law the defense of self-defense placed on the defendant only the burden
of going forward and not the burden. of establishing the defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 20 But the court of appeals rejected the challenge
on the basis of the Ohio contemporaneous-objection rule and found that
Isaac's claim had been waived by default. 2 ' The Ohio Supreme Court dis-
missed Isaac's appeal on the same day it ruled that the retroactive application
of the Robinson rule did not apply to defendants who had failed to make
contemporaneous objections. 2  The district court subsequently denied
Isaac's petition for habeas corpus relief on the ground of waiver and failure to
show cause or prejudice under the Sykes standard. 3 Finding that the Ohio
courts had denied Isaac due process, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. On rehearing, a majority of a panel of judges ruled that Isaac's
petition satisfied the Sykes cause and prejudice standard, determining that he
had had no reason to object to the instruction since before the promulgation of
the Robinson rule such an objection would have been futile, and that preju-
dice resulted because burden of proof is crucial to the fact-finding process in
criminal procedure. 
24
In the Supreme Court opinion the majority began by finding that of
Isaac's two constitutional claims only one, the allegation that Ohio could not
constitutionally shift the burden of proving self-defense to him, was colorable.
That threshold inquiry completed, the next question was whether he had
preserved his claim before the state courts, and, if not, whether the Sykes
standard barred consideration of the claim in federal court. Unwilling to
decide whether Isaac, tried prior to the enunciation of the Robinson rule,
could have reasonably been expected to make a contemporaneous objec-
tion, '5 the majority first concluded that Isaac had forfeited his constitutional
claim and then launched into a broad discussion of judicial policy, which
characterized habeas corpus proceedings as costly.2 6 Collateral review
"extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused"; liberal granting
of relief "degrades the prominence of the trial itself," often costing society
the right to punish admitted offenders; and special costs to the federal system
result from "[flederal intrusions into state criminal trials [that] frustrate both
the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempts
to honor constitutional rights." 127 With those principles of judicial economy
120. 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 103, 351 N.E.2d 88, 89 (1976).
121. 456 U.S. 107, 115 (1982).
122. Id. at 116.
123. Id. at 117-18.
124. Id. at 118.
125. "'We need not decide whether the novelty of a constitutional claim ever establishes cause for a failure
to object." Id. at 131. The majority added in a footnote that futility alone cannot constitute cause because the
Sykes cause and prejudice standard is no more exigent than the deliberate bypass standard of Fay v. Noia. Id. at
130 n.36; cf. Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 139-40 (claim that Ohio Supreme Court's selective retroactive
application of the Robinson rule denied due process was impossible because of timing).
126. 456 U.S. 107, 124-29 (1982).
127. Id. at 128.
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in place, the majority was able to dispose of all three petitioners' contentions
in short order. Petitioners had argued futility, claiming that objection to the
trial court's instructions on self-defense would have been unavailing given
Ohio's long-established common law on the subject. In language seemingly
calculated to undercut the Sixth Circuit's development of the futility excep-
tion, 28 the majority declared that for reasons of comity and finality of judg-
ment futility cannot constitute cause for a failure to object at trial:
If a defendant perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the
federal courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because he thinks they
will be unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state court that has previously rejected
a constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is
valid. 129
Lest the less tactically minded or less optimistic petitioner should think his
failure to object justifiable on the basis of excusable neglect, the majority
went on to state that the subsequent discovery of a constitutional defect
unknown at the time of trial "does not invariably render the original trial
fundamentally unfair." 130 The net effect of Isaac is to place a very consider-
able burden on the federal habeas petitioner to make a showing of cause and
prejudice under Sykes. Apparently, a large measure of both is henceforth the
key to unlocking the doors of the federal courts. 13
In a pointed dissent Justice Brennan, noting the application of res judica-
ta to limit the availablity of postconviction relief in Ohio, concluded that
because Isaac's claim was, as a practical matter, one that could not have been
raised at trial or on appeal, the federal court should have sent him back to the
state courts to pursue state postconviction relief on his unexhausted claim. '
32
The dissent concluded by refuting the majority's misconstruction of Sykes.
For Justice Brennan the Isaac decision, characterized by "unvarnished
hostility to the assertion of federal constitutional claims," '33 overextended
the Sykes standard and broke the promise in the latter decision that that
standard would not prevent a federal court from adjudicating for the first time
the federal constitutional claim of a habeas petitioner who, in the absence of
such an adjudication, would be the victim of a miscarriage of justice. 134 Here
again, conceptually the argument is very close to Justice Stevens' distinction
of the character of the claim from its procedural history.
While the ultimate impact of Isaac and Lundy on Sixth Circuit decisions
remains to be worked out, early indications are that the existing federal-state
conflict over postconviction relief in Ohio has not abated. In May 1982 the
128. See supra subpart II(B).
129. 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982).
130. Id. at 131.
131. The majority noted that the two criteria in Sykes are stated in the conjunctive. Id. at 134 n.43.
132. Id. at 139-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 148.
134. Id. (relying on the express language of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977)).
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio decided Floyd v. Marshall. 135
The court squarely confronted the question of what remained of the Keener
principle after the Lundy total exhaustion rule. Having pursued direct appeal
in the state courts and having been denied habeas corpus relief in federal court
once, petitioner Floyd apparently filed again in another district. Respondent
moved to dismiss on the mixed petition ground underlying the Lundy rule. 1
36
Reasoning that the Lundy court could not have intended any result that would
clearly conflict with the federal habeas corpus statute, the court, prior to
considering the petition on the merits, engaged in a close reading of the
statutory exhaustion requirement, focusing on the provision that a petitioner
"shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the rights under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question pre-
sented." 37 Invoking the Keener principle, the court concluded that the sta-
tute requires exhaustion of state remedies "actually available ... prior to
consideration of the issues in a habeas corpus action." "' With that jurisdic-
tional basis established, the court went on to consider whether petitioner's
unexhausted claim, one that was not specifically jurisdictional in nature, was
reviewable by the Ohio courts. Finding that no Ohio forum was available to
petitioner, the court held that although the instant petition might be mixed it
was proper for the court to review it. 3 9 Curiously, the court justified its
position by relying on some of the Supreme Court's precedential bases for the
Lundy opinion, bases that it turned back against the Lundy opinion itself. In
developing the argument in favor of the exhaustion doctrine on the basis of
comity, the Lundy court relied on Ex parte Hawk, 40 noting Hawk's statement
that the exhaustion doctrine does not bar relief "where the state remedies are
inadequate or fail to 'afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal conten-
tions raised.'" "4 The Lundy plurality also relied on Galtieri v. Wainwright, 42
a Fifth Circuit decision adopting the total exhaustion rule. But the Floyd court
stressed that the Galtieri opinion recognizes a significant exception: when the
goals of the exhaustion doctrine would not be furthered, or when an overrid-
ing federal concern would be frustrated, no attempt to exhaust the state
remedies need be made. ' The Floyd court was thereby able, albeit in a
roundabout fashion, to harmonize Lundy with the prevailing decisional law in
the Sixth Circuit embodied in Keener.
Thus, in the present state of the law, as interpreted by the federal courts,
135. 538 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
136. Id. at 383.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1976).
138. 538 F. Supp. 381, 383 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
139. Id.
140. 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
141. 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982) (quoting E parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944)).
142. 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978).
143. 538 F. Supp. 381, 384 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (citing 582 F.2d 348, 354-55 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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the Ohio petitioner finds himself in a curious predicament. State postconvic-
tion relief is available to him only to a very limited extent. Unless his claim
falls within one of the specific exceptions enumerated by the Ohio Supreme
Court in the line of decisions following Perry, it is doomed to dismissal.
Because of the broad construction the Sixth Circuit has given to the Sykes
cause and prejudice standard, he had some hope of relief in the federal courts
provided that he was able to make out a plausible claim that his constitutional
rights, or some less well defined fundamental right, had been violated. The
Sixth Circuit demonstrated a willingness to look beyond the narrow proce-
dural history of the petitioner's criminal conviction and appeal and to weigh
the possibility that he had been the victim of fundamental unfairness or that,
as a practical matter, the common law of Ohio postconviction review pre-
cluded any meaningful review of his conviction. But Floyd notwithstanding,
the 1982 decisions of the United States Supreme Court do not bode well for
Ohio petitioners. Isaac has raised the Sykes standard to such a level that it has
become a formidable hurdle.
While the irony of Justice Brennan's dissent in Isaac may have been
intended to castigate the majority for a line of reasoning whose predicates
consist entirely of a priori policy justifications, an "analysis [that] is com-
pletely result-oriented,"44 still more subtle ironies lie at the heart of the Ohio
petitioner's predicament. Justice Brennan would have reversed Isaac's peti-
tion and remanded with instructions to dismiss. Because Isaac's claim was
"manifestly of the sort that could not have been raised at trial or on
appeal,"'4 5 Justice Brennan maintained that state postconviction remedies
had not been exhausted within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus
statute.146 Isaac's direct appeal to the court of appeals had not succeeded
because the court found that his failure to object to the jury instruction at his
trial constituted a waiver, even though under existing Ohio decisional law
objection would have been speculative, if not illogical. Concededly, Isaac did
not pursue postconviction relief in the Ohio courts. Because of the institu-
tionalization of the Perry res judicata doctrine and because his constitutional
claim could have been raised at trial, if only theoretically, it is not surprising
that the petitioner proceeded directly to federal court.
A further irony appears in the majority's allusion to the possibility that
Isaac could have raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Noting
that after In re Winship' 47 numerous courts had agreed that due process
requires the prosecution to disprove certain affirmative defenses, the underly-
ing issue in Isaac's petition, the majority found that it would have been pos-
144. 456 U.S. 107,144 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 140.
146. Id. Its defects notwithstanding, the Floyd opinion suggests that Justice Brennan's analysis may have
been conclusory on this point. See supra text accompanying notes 135-43.
147. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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sible to articulate Isaac's constitutional claim.'48 But a weak defense was held
not to constitute cause under Sykes: "Where the basis of a constitutional
claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived and litigated that
claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel against labeling alleged
unawareness of the objection as cause for a procedural default." 149 The tacit
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel could have been raised in Ohio
postconviction proceedings and, in the event of an unfavorable outcome,
would have put Isaac's petition in a wholly different posture regarding the
availablity of federal review. Thus, petitioners like Isaac find themselves
trapped by procedural subtleties, with the Supreme Court, on the one hand,
suggesting that the state courts should carry out the Ragen imperative before
access to the federal courts is available and with the state courts, on the other
hand, insisting that finality of judgment ranks among the highest of legal
values.
III. THE 1982 OHIO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Completing the current picture of the availability of postconviction relief
in Ohio requires a brief consideration of three recent Ohio Supreme Court
decisions. 150 The three decisions are almost anticlimatic after Isaac and add
little to the law in the field. The policy considerations on which they rely and
the inconsistent implications they reveal, however, illuminate the crux of the
postconviction relief dilemma.
State v. Roberts,'5' decided in July 1982, is largely a mechanical reaf-
firmation of the Perry doctrine. In Roberts the supreme court held that res
judicata precludes a petitioner from asserting constitutional issues in a post-
conviction proceeding if he fails to raise these issues in a motion to certify the
record that was previously filed with the supreme court and overruled. 52 The
defendant had been indicted for obstructing justice as a result of events that
occurred at her residence when police came to arrest her sister. The sister,
however, was never indicted.' 53 The court of appeals reversed de-
fendant's conviction on the ground that a conviction for obstructing justice
can be sustained only if the person allegedly concealed is convicted. The
court of appeals did, however, enter a judgment of conviction for the lesser
included offense of resisting arrest.' 54 On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court
both parties focused on two issues: whether resisting arrest is a lesser in-
cluded offense of obstructing justice and whether the court of appeals' action
148. 456 U.S. 107, 131-33 (1982).
149. Id. at 134.
150. State v. Mapson, I Ohio St. 3d 217,438 N.E.2d 910(1982) (percuriam); State v. Roberts, I Ohio St. 3d
36, 437 N.E.2d 598 (1982); State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St. 3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (1982).
151. 1 Ohio St. 3d 36, 437 N.E.2d 598 (1982).
152. Id. at 36, 437 N.E.2d at 598-99.
153. Id. at 37, 437 N.E.2d at 599.
154. Id. at 36-37, 437 N.E.2d at 599.
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reducing the verdict to the lesser offense was proper. The appeal was denied,
and the defendant filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief,
which alleged constitutional violations resulting from the modification of the
conviction. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
petition on the basis of res judicata. 55
The issue in Roberts was whether the Perry doctrine precluded review of
any or all of the issues asserted in the postconviction proceeding. 56 Petitioner
argued that the factual context of the case created an exception to Perry
because the issues raised in the postconviction petition did not come into
existence until after the court of appeals had rendered judgment in the direct
appeal. Hence, petitioner had had no opportunity to litigate the constitutional
issues. 157 On the basis of its appellate jurisdiction as a matter of right in cases
from the courts of appeals dealing with state or federal constitutional ques-
tions, 158 the supreme court stated that petitioner could have raised the consti-
tutional issues in her motion to certify the record on direct appeal. Thus, her
failure to raise them resulted in a default under Perry. 59 Since petitioner had
pursued state postconviction remedies, were she to seek relief in the federal
courts, she would be able to clear the exhaustion hurdle but would probably
not meet the cause prong of the Sykes standard. Arguably, the Roberts
decision was correct on the law, but like Engle v. Isaac'60 it implicitly raises
the possibility of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Perhaps most interesting in the opinion is the policy rationale advanced
for the court's holding. Concerned about "the consequences which would
flow from allowing petitioners to assert issues which have not been presented
at the earliest possible opportunity," ' 6' the court raised the double specters of
defendants who might "sandbag" constitutional issues in the hope that their
claims would prevail on postconviction review and defendants who might
bypass direct appeal to deny the supreme court the opportunity for initial
review of the trial court's verdict of guilty. 62 To allow a petitioner to litigate
constitutional issues in postconviction proceedings when the issues could
have been raised on direct appeal would be to relegate the trial court "to
disposing of the action on technicalities or collateral issues, as opposed to the
merits."'63 Ironically, this representation of the result to be avoided aptly
characterizes Ohio postconviction jurisprudence. At least since Perry the
decisional law on postconviction relief has been based on procedural short-
comings almost to the exclusion of any deliberation on the merits.
155. Id., 437 N.E.2d at 599-600.
156. Id. at 38, 437 N.E.2d at 600.
157. Id.
158. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2.
159. i Ohio St. 3d 36, 38-39, 437 N.E.2d 598, 600-01 (1982).
160. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
161. 1 Ohio St. 3d 36, 39, 437 N.E.2d 598, 601 (1982).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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The outcome of Roberts was not surprising given Ohio precedent. In the
Roberts opinion Engle v. Isaac formed a subtext that was never far from the
surface of the former's policy rationale. Less than a month after Roberts, with
its restrictive approach to the availablity of postconviction relief, the same
court in State v. Mapson,'64 a six-to-one per curiam decision, seemed more
inclined to make postconviction relief available. The case presented only a
procedural issue dealing with the timeliness of an appeal from the denial of a
petition for postconviction relief; 165 the opinion does not reveal the substance
of the petitioner's claim. The petitioner's attempt to seek postconviction relief
had been dismissed by the trial court; while the journal entry noted that
findings of fact and conclusions of law had been filed, as required by section
2953.21, they were actually not filed until more than seven months later.
Meanwhile, petitioner's appeal to the court of appeals was overruled because
it had not been filed within the specified period.'66 The court accepted peti-
tioner's contention and held that a judgment denying postconviction relief is
incomplete without, the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, the
entry of an incomplete judgment does not commence the running of the time
period for filing an appeal.' 67 This outcome is but a logical extension of the
court's position in earlier decisions on compliance with statutory proce-
dure.' 6
A series of policy reasons justified the court's position: the need to ap-
prise the petitioner of the grounds for the trial court's action and to establish
the record for appellate review, the need to decrease the workload of the
courts of appeals, and the need to discourage judicial disinterest. 169 Thus, the
need to conform to the spirit and the letter of the Post-Conviction Remedy
Act dictated a lenient approach to petitioner's procedural mistake.'70 Justice
Krupansky, author of the Roberts opinion, dissented, stressing that postcon-
viction proceedings were civil proceedings governed by the Rules of Appel-
late Procedure. Relying on an earlier statement by the court that these rules
supersede all procedural statutes in conflict with them,' 7' Justice Krupansky
insisted that the absolute thirty-day limit for the filing should have been ob-
served and that the petitioner should have requested an extension or sought a
writ of mandamus to compel filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law. 172 Most striking is the dissent's recourse to policy justifications echoing
the insistence in Roberts on the integrity of the judicial system. Justice
Krupansky concluded: "Furthermore, it is plain to me the majority... has
164. 1 Ohio St. 3d 217, 438 N.E.2d 910 (1982) (per curiam).
165. Id. at 218, 438 N.E.2d at 911.
166. Id. at 217, 438 N.E.2d at 911.
167. Id. at 218, 438 N.E.2d at 911-12.
168. See supra text accompanying note 42.
169. I Ohio St. 3d 217, 219-20, 438 N.E.2d 910, 913-14 (1982).
170. Id. at 218-19, 438 N.E.2d at 912-13.
171. State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St. 2d 208, 210, 324 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1975).
172. 1 Ohio St. 3d 217, 220-21, 438 N.E.2d 910, 914 (1982) (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 44:537
OHIO POSTCONVICTION REVIEW DILEMMA
disrupted the orderly progression of cases through the appellate process. In
addition, their holding will create chaos in the legal community since attor-
neys will become increasingly unsure of how this court will administer the
appellate rules."' 73 Because the procedure for handling postconviction relief
petitions has been firmly established, the trial court's negligence in the
Mapson case warrants some relaxation of the Appellate Rules. Speculations
about disorder and chaos can hardly justify a rule-bound outcome contrary to
the spirit and the letter of the underlying statute. Finally, any possible ques-
tion of the merits of the petition cannot be reached when the traditions of the
judicial institution preclude review.
The importance of the third decision, State v. Cole,'74 decided in Decem-
ber 1982, lies in its treatment of one of the only theories for postconviction
relief that may still be viable for Ohio petitioners-ineffective assistance of
counsel. In Cole the petitioner had been charged with rape and attempted
rape. After initial pleading he later waived prosecution by indictment, entered
no contest pleas to reduced charges, and was found guilty and sentenced.' 75
On appeal the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Proceeding pro se, the
petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment and sentence; the motion was
subsequently treated as a petition for postconviction relief. Basing his claim
on evidence that was not part of the record, petitioner claimed that he had
been denied effective assistance of counsel. On res judicata grounds the trial
court dismissed the petition without a hearing; the court of appeals
affirmed.' 76 Although acknowledging that ineffective assistance of counsel
constituted a major exception to the Perry doctrine, the Ohio Supreme Court
refused to extend that exception to the situation under consideration because
new counsel had represented the petitioner on direct appeal. Thus, nothing
prevented raising that issue once the case had gotten beyond the trial court.
The court went on to hold that the evidence adduced in support of the petition
seemed contrived and that the record showed overwhelming evidence of trial
counsel's competence. '77 The Cole decision leaves open, however, the ques-
tion of how the defendant is to proceed should the new counsel prove ineffec-
tive.
In view of the evidentiary basis for the decision, the opinion signals that
the Perry doctrine will be invoked whenever possible and that a petitioner
must follow the dictates of Roberts by raising every conceivable constitu-
tional issue at the earliest possible point. The policy cited to justify this
approach is the avoidance of frivolous appeals, whence the need to circum-
scribe the inherent difficulty of postconviction review.' 78 In sum, Cole adds
173. Id. at 221, 438 N.E.2d at 914.
174. 2 Ohio St. 3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (1982).
175. Id. at 112, 443 N.E.2d at 170.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 113-15, 443 N.E.2d at 171-72.
178. Id. at 115,443 N.E.2d at 172 (relying on the analysis in State v. Milanovich, 42 Ohio St. 2d 46,51,325
N.E.2d 540, 543 (1975)).
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little to the law of postconviction relief. But an enigmatic remark near the end
of the opinion may well hold the key to the court's willingness to review the
case: "Although the court which reviewed appellant's petition could have
based its decision on his failure to state a justifiable claim for relief, we cannot
fault the court for its choice of grounds upon which it predicated its deci-
sion." 79 The supreme court seems to suggest that Cole's petition was legally
insufficient; the evidence simply would not support the claim. And yet that
wholly appropriate ratio decidendi is eschewed in favor of a disposition that,
bolstered by a shallow, self-evident policy rationale, creates yet another
procedural trap for Ohio petitioners. Perhaps knowingly, the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision will continue to displace the burden of deciding petitions for
collateral review from the state courts. By making the procedural require-
ments for raising the issue of ineffective counsel as stringent as possible, the
court has maintained the potential for conflict between the federal and the
state courts.
Thus, the recent Ohio decisions send two very different messages. When,
as in Mapson, judicial carelessness threatens to deny a petitioner even
minimal review of his plausible constitutional claim, the burden of procedural
exactitude is not on the petitioner. But in other contexts, even those like Cole
in which petitioners traditionally have had some hope of success in the state
courts, the burden of procedural exactitude falls very heavily on the peti-
tioner. Finality of judgment and the prominence of judicial proceedings are
clearly the prevailing values in postconviction relief. Therefore, criminal
defense in Ohio is more than ever a matter of tactics and especially of handl-
ing constitutional claims that figure into it, or might arise during it, with the
greatest of care.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Practical Implications for Ohio Petitioners Seeking
Postconviction Review
A full understanding of the present state of the law of postconviction
remedies in Ohio has required retracing the history of the original statutes and
the development of the state decisional law that has defined the scope and
availability of collateral review of criminal convictions. The federal courts'
handling of the scope and availablity of habeas corpus review is no less
important since it has served as an alternative mechanism for convicted indi-
viduals to assert their federal rights. In the present state of affairs federal-state
relations in this area are in disequilibrium. Henceforth, the strategy of peti-
tioners is likely to be determined by the future direction of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, by whether it hews to the rule of Isaac or attempts to
179. 2 Ohio St. 3d 112, 115, 443 N.E.2d 169, 172 (1982).
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harmonize the Keener doctrine with the restrictions imposed by recent
Supreme Court decisions.
A second consequence follows from the present state of the law. As a
practical matter, individuals convicted of crimes in the Ohio courts will
choose to press their claims on the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel
for three reasons. First, this theory is the most viable exception to the Perry
rule. '80 Second, provided that the petitioner does not run afoul of the timing
requirements imposed by the Cole decision, 181 it will be possible to raise the
issue on postconviction review. Last, and most important, because the
asserted right is federal in nature, it will also be possible to preserve it in
federal court if the outcome in state court is unfavorable, assuming that the
Sykes cause and prejudice standard is met. Should the individual decide, or be
obliged, to change counsel prior to the completion of direct review, under
Cole failure to assert ineffective assistance of counsel will result in a forfeiture
of any alleged claim.
The appellant's task in the state courts will not be easy. His case must
meet the two-part standard articulated by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v.
Lytle: 1
8 2
First, there must be a determination as to whether there has been a substantial
violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client. Next, and
analytically separate from the question of whether the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights were violated, there must be a determination as to whether the defense
was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. 183
The burden of showing the first part of the standard is on the appellant since a
licensed attorney is presumed competent. 184 The test for deciding this issue is
"whether the accused, under all the circumstances .... had a fair trial and
substantial justice was done." 185 Concerning the burden of proof on the sec-
ond part of the standard, the Lytle court indicated its willingness to accept the
predominant authority in the federal courts. The initial burden is on the
appellant because the claim resulted from the acts of the defendant's lawyer
rather than from the state's conduct; hence, to impose the initial burden on
the State would penalize the prosecution for acts that it could not have con-
trolled. '86
The predicament that the Lytle test created for postconviction petitioners
became apparent four years later in State v. Jackson. '87 In Jackson the trial
180. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 174-79.
182. 48 Ohio St. 2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976).
183. Id. at 396-97, 358 N.E.2d at 627.
184. Id. at 397, 358 N.E.2d at 627.
185. State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St. 2d 71, 79, 341 N.E.2d 304, 310 (1976).
186. 48 Ohio St. 2d391,397,358 N.E.2d 623,627 (1976) (following McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207,218
(8th Cir. 1974)).
187. 64 Ohio St. 2d 107, 413 N.E.2d 819 (1980), discussed in State v. Jackson: Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 577 (1981).
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court had summarily dismissed the postconviction petition, which was based
in part on ineffective assistance of counsel; although the court of appeals
reversed, the supreme court found the summary dismissal proper."'s The
court stated that a postconviction petitioner bears the burden of submitting
evidentiary documents "containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate
the lack of competent counsel and also that the defense was prejudiced by
counsel's ineffectiveness. "' 89 Notably, the trial counsel, appointed only one
week before trial as a substitute for the original trial counsel, stated in an
affidavit that he had had insufficient time to prepare adequately.' 90 The
supreme court found that petitioner had not met his initial burden of demon-
strating that substantive grounds for relief existed and that an evidentiary
hearing was required under section 2953.21(E) of the Ohio Revised Code.' 9'
The dissent, however, asserted that the constitutional claim was facially suf-
ficient and argued that a hearing was required because the claim depended on
evidence that was outside the record. In the dissent's view petitioner was
within the rule of State v. Milanovich:'92 a petitioner for postconviction
review has state substantive grounds for relief when the claim is sufficient on
its face to raise a constitutional issue and when the claim depends on factual
allegations that cannot be determined by examining the files and records of
the case. 93
A petition based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is vulner-
able in the Ohio courts. Given Jackson, such a claim is subject to dismissal
even if the legal sufficiency of its evidentiary basis could be established only
by a hearing. The flaw in this standard lies in the predicament it creates for the
petitioner. Only the most blatant incompetence is apt to appear on the face of
the record. While the petitioner has the right to support his petition with
documentation, it is unlikely that this means will be effective for substantiat-
ing his theory unless attorneys can be convinced to be utterly candid in
affidavits concerning their alleged incompetence. Testimony at a hearing, as
provided for in section 2953.22, '94 would be more effective in developing the
appropriate evidence. Should the petition survive initial scrutiny, the peti-
tioner faces a heavy burden of proof. Actually, the test defined in Lytle is
nearly as stringent as the Sykes cause and prejudice standard in the construc-
tion given it by Isaac.
95
That ineffective assistance of counsel remains central as both a basis for
postconviction review and an avenue to federal review is reflected in the
188. 64 Ohio St. 2d 107, 107-08, 413 N.E.2d 819, 819-21 (1980).
189. Id. at 111, 413 N.E.2d at 822.
190. Id. at 107-08, 413 N.E.2d at 820-21.
191. Id. at 113, 413 N.E.2d at 823.
192. 42 Ohio St. 2d 46, 325 N.E.2d 540 (1975).
193. 64 Ohio St. 2d 107, 114-15, 413 N.E.2d 819, 824-25 (1980) (W. Brown, J., dissenting) (relying on the
Milanovich syllabus, 42 Ohio St. 2d 46, 46, 325 N.E.2d 540, 540 (1975).
194. See supra note 23.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 125-31.
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inconsistency of the Ohio test with the current test in the Sixth Circuit. While
the Ohio test focuses on unfairness at trial, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a
higher, more professionally oriented standard: "[C]ounsel must be reason-
ably likely to render and must render reasonably effective assistance. Counsel
must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the
criminal law and must conscientiously protect the defendant's inter-
est .. .. 196 Because the Ohio courts do not have the last word on the federal
constitutional right to effective counsel, the same frustration of comity and
federalism that the Isaac court sought to abate may subsist as petitioners seek
review under the more favorable federal standard for effective assistance of
counsel.
Three results are likely to flow from petitioners' attempts to rely primari-
ly on the theory of ineffective assistance for postconviction relief. First, the
defense attorney's role will become increasingly difficult because of the
perception that anything less than a perfectly mounted defense will result in
forfeiture of rights. Without a clear statement from the Supreme Court on the
content of the sixth amendment's requirement of effective assistance of
counsel, federal collateral review, which offers no assurance of consistent
results, will be the mainstay of adjudication on this issue. Reliance on sixth
amendment doctrine to safeguard constitutional rights and resultant findings
of ineffectiveness would encumber delivery of legal services by failing to shift
to the states the burden of maintaining high standards of professional com-
petence. 97 Second, because the volume of petitions and the trend to pursue
habeas review in the federal courts will not abate, the judicial work load will
not be reduced. As long as he meets the Cole timing requirements, the peti-
tioner will have every reason to pursue review through the state courts and on
through the federal courts. Amelioration of federal-state judicial relations will
not result from such a situation, and the legal profession may find itself with
an added burden of self-regulation. Last, state trial courts are increasingly
likely to become the principal forum of constitutional adjudication for
criminal jurisprudence. Restrictions on the availablity of review will compel
scrupulous defense attorneys to raise and litigate every plausible constitu-
tional claim that matures prior to or during the trial. The length and complex-
ity of criminal trials will increase accordingly.
B. Judicial Efficiency and Dignity Versus Full and Fair Adjudication
The present law of postconviction review in both the Ohio and the federal
courts has resulted from important shifts in policy. Among the crosscurrents
that have produced the present state of affairs, certain appear to have a shared
significance at both the federal and state levels. Concern for comity and
196. Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1981).
197. Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 981, 1008-12 (1982).
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federalism is no doubt the broadest policy rationale invoked in the recent
decisions. Indeed, it was among the implicit considerations in Young v.
Ragen98 that became explicit in Case v. Nebraska'99 when the Supreme
Court renewed its injunction to the states to create meaningful postconviction
review procedures.
The shift that has occurred on the questions of comity and federalism
appears in the ends to which these arguments are put. In Case and Ragen the
desirability of a state's retaining responsibility for its own criminal procedure
and any concomitant federal constitutional implications outweighed the desir-
ability of maintaining the federal courts' role as ultimate arbiters of federal
constitutional protections. The same consideration of avoiding federal inter-
vention is equally vital in Lundy and Isaac. If Ragen stands for the principle
that the onus is on the states to do something so that the federal courts will not
have to, Lundy stands for the corollary that the federal courts are not to
assume the state courts' burden under Ragen. The invocation of comity and
federalism veils the consideration that everyone recognizes but hesitates to
confront candidly: petitions whose merits are dubious will be filed. Until and
unless the Sixth Circuit falls into line with Lundy and Isaac, the impetus to
seek federal review will not diminish, and criminal defense lawyers will be
compelled not to yield, but to devise new strategies. Thus, the goal of
harmony between the state and federal courts in Ohio may be achieved only at
the cost of the real possibility that meritorious constitutional claims will go
unreviewed. The Burger Court's retrenchment from the Warren Court's
expansive view of habeas corpus reflects the former's position that state
courts can be entrusted with enforcement of federal law, that the risk of error
is offset by the availability of direct review in the Supreme Court, and that
relitigation in the federal courts disserves federal-state judicial harmony.200
Ultimately, the policy of comity and federalism that justifies restricted avail-
ablity of federal habeas corpus review reaffirms the sufficiency of the rigor
and correctness of criminal prosecution in state trial courts.
Aside from the practical ramifications for trial court dockets and pro-
cedure,20 ' important policy questions arise from making state trial courts the
principal forum for adjudication of constitutional protections within the
criminal process. 20 2 Although it is often argued that federal review of federal
constitutional claims is preferable to state court review because of disparity in
competency, objectivity, and resources between the two judiciaries, 23 a more
significant consideration may be institutional orientation.
198. 337 U.S. 235, 238 (1949).
199. 381 U.S. 336, 339-40 (1%5) (Clark, J., concurring); see also id. at 344-46 (Brennan, J., concurring).
200. L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 21 (1981).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 127 & 173.
202. Concededly, the state trial court's fact-finding process often plays a critical role in the controversy.
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (1977).
203. Id. at 1121-27.
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The institutional differences between state and federal courts indicate the
need for the federal judiciary to be the final arbiters of constitutional claims. 04
From the standpoint of professional practice, federal judges are more likely to
make astute applications of federal law and to recognize both the extraterri-
torial implications of their decisions and the value of uniform application of
constitutional principles. 20 5 From the standpoint of social organization,
federal judges are likely to be influenced less by the objectives of state
criminal law and its enforcers than by the individual and countermajoritarian
perspective of the Bill of Rights. 206 Because the federal statute reflects a
broader electorate than that which selects state judges, the role of the federal
judiciary is integral to effectuation of the federal legislative imperative.0 7
Historically state courts have been insensitive to constitutional rights; thus
federal habeas corpus review serves not only a corrective, but also a deter-
rent, purpose. Potential reversal by federal courts may do more than institu-
tional factors to create parity between the federal and state judiciaries. 2°s
Above all, to the extent that the federal statute represents Congress' de-
termination that federal tribunals will vindicate federal rights, the concern for
comity, the obviation of friction between the state and federal courts, that has
dominated the recent direction of the law may be inapposite. 209
Notwithstanding federal-state disparities, closing the doors of both the
Ohio and the federal courts bespeaks a policy that values efficient judicial
proceedings more highly than either the scrupulous protection of individual
rights or the maintenance of safeguards within the criminal process. Without
legislative action, the immediate results will be increased risk that the in-
nocent will be convicted and that a defense attorney's error, inexperience,
lack of diligence, or tactical decision will produce an irremediable forfeiture of
rights. 210 Furthermore, unlike an individual who is a losing party in other
forms of litigation, the person convicted of a crime is subject not only to fine
or imprisonment, but also to a range of detrimental consequences. He may
204. Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 666
(1982).
205. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 510 (1963); Beyond Custody: Expanding Collateral Review of State Convictions, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
465, 471-72 (1981).
206. Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 666-67
(1982).
207. Id. at 667.
208. Id. at 667-68.
209. Id. at 669. See generally Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981) (redundancy in the design of a system assures reliability; the
dual judicial system reflects the social value of systems in conflict with one another). But see McGowan, The
Viewvfronz an Inferior Court, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 659 (1982) (collateral attack on state criminal convictions
rankles state-federal judicial relations; federal courts should not have to exercise supervisory authority over
state criminal law unless justice necessitates it).
210. Arguably, shifting the burden of constitutional protection to state courts is justified to the extent that
the states are best situated to decrease the frequency of procedural defaults and to promote professional skill.
Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 981, 1000-03 (1982).
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suffer statutory disabilities and sanctions such as impeachment in future trials
or denial of parole, as well as the loss of his personal liberty and the continu-
ing stigma of being a convicted criminal. 21' All the collateral effects of convic-
tion need to be weighed carefully in any policy deliberation.
The policy considerations that have guided the Ohio Supreme Court
decisions on postconviction review and regained prominence in the United
States Supreme Court decisions are actually all familiar. What is new about
the policy arguments in these decisions is the use made of them. As Justice
Brennan's dissent points out, the Isaac opinion illustrates the application of
policy in a way that makes it the controlling consideration in legal reason-
ing.212 In the words of Justice Brennan, "The Court's analysis is completely
result-oriented, and represents a noteworthy exercise in... judicial activ-
ism . . .,213 Making habeas review available in the federal courts entails
significant costs, according to the majority; it extends the ordeal of the trial,
degrades the prominence of the trial, deprives society of the right to punish
admitted offenders, and strains federal-state judicial relations. 2 4 But the
policy reasons that would justify placing finality of conviction before the
accuracy of the trial's truth-finding function, punishment of offenders before
the fair allocation of the burden of proof, and comity before the principle of
federal constitutional supremacy 2 5 all point to a preference for tolerating the
risks identified above. The Isaac majority attempted to respond to Brennan's
dissent by insisting that the majority opinion was adjudicating the claims of
each of the petitioners and that it did not seek merely to expound the law.
2
,
6
These assertions, however, belie the underlying conceptual strategy of the
majority opinion. Policy considerations enable the Court to project the poten-
tial undesirable consequences of deciding the case in a given way. From this
decisional first principle two lesser principles of adjudication follow. First,
policy principles are logically prior to production of ajust decision; that is, the
outcome of a given case as an adjudication of the issues matters much less
than the pronouncement on general policy directions that will guide the
judiciary. Second, and as a consequence, the substance of the claim, as dis-
tinguished from the substance of some other claim, is an ancillary matter.
The operation of the same factors is still more apparent in the recent Ohio
Supreme Court decisions. The opinion in the most far-reaching of these deci-
sions, State v. Roberts,2 7 purports to decide the issue on the basis of the
211. Beyond Custody: Expanding Collateral Review of State Convictions, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465,
468-69 (1981); see also Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929
(1970).
212. 456 U.S. 107, 143-44 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 144.
214. 456 U.S. 107, 126-28 (1982).
215. Id. at 146-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. 456 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1982).
217. 1 Ohio St. 3d 36, 437 N.E.2d 598 (1982).
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court's appellate jurisdiction, but hastens to make explicit the policy assump-
tions that legitimate its operative ratio decidendi:
The propriety of our conclusion is emphasized when one considers the conse-
quences which would flow from allowing petitioners to assert issues which have
not been presented at the earliest possible opportunity. Defendants would be
encouraged to deliberately refrain from advancing constitutional issues on an
original appeal to this court in the hope that their claims would ultimately be
allowed on postconviction relief.
21 8
The opinion then speculates about the frustration of the state's enforcement
of its criminal code by defendants who had the tactical acumen to "sandbag"
constitutional claims.219 In this scenario deserved convictions would be lost to
technicalities and collateral issues. A perfectly just legal system would
not require collateral review. But implicit in the Sixth Circuit's
approach to habeas corpus relief has been the lingering suspicion that the
Ohio courts have responded inadequately to the imperative of constitutional
protections within the criminal process. That approach, in turn, rests on the
implicit assumption that, given the high stakes for the individual convicted of
a crime, the federal courts are better able to handle the attendant constitu-
tional issues. The increase in crime and the increased number of petitions for
collateral review pose very real problems; however, the recent state and
federal decisions are likely not to stem the flow of petitions for collateral
review, but only to change its course. Claims based on the constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel are undoubtedly the only way out of the
present dilemma. Thus, despite recent developments in the federal law,
reliance upon federal review will not lessen, but will only proceed from a
different theory.
In the present state of affairs an Ohio petitioner for postconviction relief
finds himself facing an irreducible contradiction. The Perry doctrine denies
postconviction access to the state courts, which have been charged with
primary responsibility for the integrity of the criminal process; the Lundy and
Isaac decisions deny postconviction access to the federal courts, which have
the ultimate word on questions of constitutional law. Short of legislative
action, if the earnest petitioner is to have his day in court, it will depend on the
ability of the federal courts to give weight to the subtle conceptual distinction
drawn by the court in Floyd v. Marshall220 on the basis of its close reading of
the text of the federal habeas corpus statute. According to that distinction, the
exhaustion requirement for federal habeas corpus review applies only to state
remedies that are actually available. 22' Failing that distinction, the petitioner's
218. Id. at 39, 437 N.E.2d at 601.
219. Id.
220. 538 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 135-41.
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opportunity to be heard will depend on the court's inherent sense of equity,
on its willingness to recognize shades of distinction that permit a differen-
tiation of frivolous petitions from those that attempt to raise a fundamental
issue that has yet to have a full and fair hearing. Although the state of the law
in the Sixth Circuit prior to the recent Supreme Court decisions did not
promote harmonious federal-state judicial relations, it had the advantage of
assuring an equitable disposition of constitutional claims. The Supreme
Court's efforts to cut back on the expansiveness of Fay v. Noia have over-
looked the possibility that a reasonable, workable standard for federal review
of state convictions, a standard that would be consistent with the dictates of
comity and constitutional protection, is feasible.rn
H. Bruce von Ohlen
222. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
